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When considering the relation between languages, it seems
intuitive that there are common references reflecting simple
empirical observations. One would not expect there to be any
great difficulty in translating terms such as “tree” or “chair;” what
difficulties arise, however, as translation moves away from these
basic referential terms? Willard Quine writes in “Meaning and
Translation” that “Empirical meaning is what the sentences of one
language and their firm translations in another language have in
common.”1 Quine argues that linguistic meaning is purely
referential and is derived from the symbolism of a term. He uses
radical translation—a theoretical situation of creating correlations
between a familiar language and one completely alien (which he
calls the “jungle” language)—to draw his point, claiming that
“What we objectively have is just an evolving adjustment to
nature, reflected in an evolving set of dispositions to be prompted
by stimulations to assent to or dissent from occasion sentences.”2
This view of language is one which begins with common
references such as basic objects of perception, and then builds
more complex terms, phrases, and combinations of meanings to
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express more conceptual notions. The conceptual grid of
language as a whole is then that of empirical perception—any
abstraction is the combination of these more basic terms, and no
inter-lingual equivalence would be guaranteed between
abstractions, even assuming that the basic terms have a degree of
equivalence.
Quine states that “…the analogies [or, correlations] weaken
as we move out toward the theoretical sentences, farthest from
observation. Thus who would undertake to translate “Neutrinos
lack mass” into the jungle language? If anyone does, we may
expect him to coin new native words or distort the usage of old
ones.”3 This claim seems true, regardless of whether we accept his
argument of the empirical nature of inter-lingual relations and of a
minimal conceptual grid—sense and consideration show how
difficult translation and understanding become as we move from
concrete terms towards those more abstract. For example, the
phrase “Rabbits have weight” naturally shows itself to be easier to
translate than “Neutrinos lack mass” due to the former’s basic
nature of linguistic meaning and the abstract, complex correlations
of meaning contained in the latter phrase.
What implications does this difficulty of translating
abstract language hold in regards to practical matters, outside of
the realm of Quine’s experiment of radical translation?
Considering philosophy as a study typically involving abstract
terms and concepts, we are then faced with an interesting and
extremely significant difficulty of translating philosophical works.
Conveyance of meaning through translation is obviously a crucial
aim for any work that is translated—with this concern of the
translatability of abstract terminology, however, philosophy seems
to have an added element of difficulty. As a field which relies on
an array of abstract vocabulary, how do we translate a work and
still remain faithful to both the thinker and the source language
(SL)? By translating key terms do we risk disturbing the very
essence or meaning of a work, and by transplanting an author’s
thought do we risk changing the very message itself? Our goal is
to examine this problem—it will be seen that this is a very real
risk, and that complete equivalence cannot always be expected,
3
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and that in some cases the author’s very ideas can be endangered
by translation and interpretation.
The first example is the ancient Greek term nomos.
Richard Kraut tells how “the Greek term that is translated as
‘law’—nomos—covers not only the enactments of a lawgiver or
legislature, but also the customs, norms, and unwritten rules of a
community.”4 Our contemporary concept of law lacks the same
meaning as that of the Greek culture. We consider law as existing
beyond societal norms: as Kraut points out, we may say “that
slavery is contrary to the moral law, and that this law existed
before the wrongness of slavery began to receive general
recognition.” On the contrary, nomos necessarily includes the
sociological background of a community and its legal system.
There is a cultural discrepancy, and therefore a potential loss of
meaning, between the term nomos and the English word “law” into
which it is typically translated.5
In his article titled “The Problem of Translating” Hans
W.L. Freudenthal discusses this problem of equivalence in
translation. Words are not isolated terms with static meanings—he
claims that “Each word has been coined in a specific atmosphere, it
has its own history; the metamorphoses of meaning throughout
time often demonstrate this fact [dynamic, mutable nature of
terms] with a distinctness baffling to linguists.”6 He brings up an
example from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil,
discussing Helen Zimmern’s translation of de Epochistik as
“science of epochs”:
The phrase “science of epochs” makes no sense at all, and
the context suggests a very different meaning. It is obvious
that the word Epochistik will not be found in any
dictionary. The translation of Nietzsche’s works
presupposes a study of the peculiarities of his brilliant style
and acquaintance with the fact that his procedure was
willfully creative in the matter of the coinage of words.
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But more than this: one has to be well informed
concerning the things constantly present to this
philosopher’s inner eye and which provide him continually
with the images, analogies and similarities that he
explores.7
In this case we see the problem that Quine discussed in
approaching abstract translation—Epochistik is a term which lacks
one-to-one equivalence or any easy correlation that does not
involve significant footnoting or drawn out language. Interestingly
enough, in this case even those solutions would seemingly fall
short, as footnoting and extenuated, lengthy explanations are by no
means Nietzsche’s style, and would risk changing the very nature
of his thought—this, however, is an issue which we will briefly
delay.
Does this difficulty and potential untranslatability of
Epochistik then damage the meaning that Nietzsche intended? If
“science of epochs” is not an accurate translation, then some of the
value or meaning is definitely lost—the question then is if this
difficulty is significant in whether or not it hinders the conveyance
of meaning. Another example may be seen in translations of The
Genealogy of Morals. An extremely important aspect of this text
is the separation between the terms das Böseste and das Schlechte.
For Nietzsche, the separation between these words, translated by
Walter Kaufmann as “evil” and “bad” respectively, is immensely
important to the entire discussion of the “slave” and “nobility,” and
the very antithesis drawn between these opposite concepts hinge
around understanding a clear division between the two. In his
introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra Kaufmann discusses
difficulties with the translation by Thomas Common, writing that
Common “coins ‘baddest’ in a passage in which Nietzsche says
‘most evil’”8 in The Genealogy of Morals. Thomas Common’s
apparent failure to draw an oppositional difference between “Good
and Bad” and “Good and Evil” by mistranslating das Böseste
greatly damages Nietzsche’s entire project and demonstrates
significant loss of meaning stemming from the same basic
7
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problems seen in the difficulty of understanding what
Freudenthal considered “the philosopher’s inner eye.”
In putting trust into translations, one would hope that it
would portray the most accurate equivocation possible and would
not contain gross mistranslations such as Common’s coinage of
“baddest.” Nonetheless, even in an ideal translation, the problem
discussed above is very real and it is understood that translation
lies in finding a compromise between the source text and the target
language. In response to this worry, some translators have chosen
to leave certain crucial terms untranslated and not risk replacing
them with a word from the target language which may be loaded
with a meaning that varies from the source term. One example of
this is the English translations of Heidegger and the term Dasein.
In a version of Being and Time translated by John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson, this word is left untranslated and explained in
its first instance by a footnote. They tell how “the word ‘Dasein’
plays so important a role in this work and is already so familiar to
the English-speaking reader who has read about Heidegger, that it
seems simpler to leave it untranslated except in the relatively rare
passages…”9 This practice of not translating terms then tries to
avoid this problem of finding a word in the TL that signifies a
closely accurate meaning for a crucial and difficult word in the SL.
By leaving the original word untranslated, which can be seen as in
a sense coining a new word in the TL, the translator then decides to
explain the meaning outside of the original author’s thought itself,
using mechanisms such as footnotes—through this the term may
be expanded and explained more proficiently and still be kept in a
similar context as the original work.
Footnoting and other methods of avoiding the problem of
untranslatability seem to be closely related to what Jonathan Cohen
had in mind when he claims in “Are Philosophical Theses Relative
to Language?” that “this is what constitutes a fundamental
difference between philosophy and grammar—when philosophical
theses mention an expression there is nothing to prevent that
expression’s being translated along with the rest of the thesis. You
can find, for instance, books about the rules of Aristotelian logic
written in many different natural languages and all using the same
9
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example for a syllogism…”10 Cohen’s statement is in the
context of an argument between the translatability of grammatical
and philosophical theses, and while this may be seemingly offtopic, his claim is one which is important and shows both truth and
falsity. Cohen uses the universal syllogism “all men are mortal” to
support this assertion of the translatability of philosophical theses,
and his claim in this specific instance does seem to be true. This
example, however, is a very basic instance of “philosophical”
thought—neither the terms nor the overall proposition portray
much of a degree of abstraction. The thesis “All men are mortal”
is undoubtedly less complex of a claim than a statement such as
“True moral action follows the categorical imperative.” This is no
attempt to make an overall comparison between the translatability
of Aristotle and Kant, but rather to show a flaw in Cohen’s
argument. Granted, philosophical terms and theses may be
translated with different degrees of equivalence, as a simpler
proposition such as Cohen’s example seems to lend itself to
translation rather easily while the latter example would be much
more difficult. Nonetheless, his argument seems to fall short of
any serious critique of the examples given previously—in many
instances translation deals with concepts of abstraction which are
loaded with cultural and linguistic meaning that are both
inseparable (at least to some degree) from the SL and alien to the
TL. Furthermore, Cohen’s argument also necessarily considers
philosophical concepts distinctly separate from grammar and
language itself. What happens when philosophy is not separate
from the use of language?
An example of this problem may be seen in poetry. When
translating poetry do we concern ourselves primarily with retaining
the meaning of the words and sacrifice the sense and feeling of the
work? Or, instead, do we retain the latter and risk damage to the
meaning, which may be lost from poorer word choices? Either
way, the translator risks damage to the original instance of art. The
previous examples of philosophical terms in translation
demonstrate that we cannot always expect a one-to-one
equivalence when moving into another language, and instead must
use devices such as footnoting or expanding a thought into a longer
10
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sequence of terms or phrases. In many instances it could be
argued that this does not damage the meaning of a philosophical
thesis or of an abstract concept, such as the argument expressed by
Cohen. What if, however, philosophy held similar aspects as those
of poetry and we could not separate grammar, syntax, and meaning
so easily?
In many cases this seems to be a rather absurd question.
Philosophy, in numerous respects, does seem to be separate from
the sense of language in the overall work—metaphysics, for
example, is typically a study in which language serves to logically
connect philosophical terms. In this sense, while the terms may
face difficulties of translation, the translator would most likely
favor the equivalence of terms over the style of the SL. But not all
philosophy is formatted or stylized as metaphysical discourse, not
all authors use language for the same purposes, and the notion that
philosophy could use language and feeling in the same way as
poetry is quite important to the way in which we consider its
translation.
Nietzsche’s work serves as an excellent example for this
consideration. Unlike metaphysics and similar philosophy,
Nietzsche sought after a very different project. It is not a project
which, like generations of thinkers before, sought to define lofty
eternals or definite absolutes. Nietzsche’s philosophy is that which
is seen in his works such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The
Antichrist—his project is that of the “revaluation of values,” of the
pursuit of perspectives. Sarah Kofman discusses this very nature
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, writing that
Tyranny is reprehensible in all its forms, including that of
any philosopher seeking to raise his spontaneous evaluation
to the status of an absolute value and his style to that of a
philosophical style ‘in itself’, opposed to poetic style ‘in
itself’ like truth opposed to untruth, good to evil… Whether
writing is conceptual or metaphorical (and since Nietzsche
the opposition has hardly applied any longer), the essential
thing is… to be at enough of a distance from it to make fun
of it.11
11
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The typical philosophical style—what Kofman argues as the style
of the “metaphysician”—is that of transcending both meaning and
language to absolutes, to logical propositions which are universal,
or as close to universal as possible. This is not Nietzsche, and his
language mirrors his philosophy. Similar to poetry, language does
not serve merely as a vehicle for Nietzsche’s meaning, but rather it
works in conjunction with his philosophy. His language and his
thought are not separate—together, they are his meaning. To quote
Walter Kaufmann, who seems to understand this very same point:
…it is impossible to be faithful to the content while
sacrificing the form: meaning and mood are inseparable. If
the translator makes things easy for himself and omits a
play on words, he unwittingly makes a lighthearted pun or
rhyme look serious, if he does not reduce the whole
passage to nonsense.12
For Nietzsche this mutual connection is that of his use of
metaphor—by creating this reflection between meaning and sense,
between his thought and the very use of his language, he brings
about the revaluation that his philosophy itself cries out for. By
the use of metaphor and poetic style he creates the ability for a
plurality of perspectives and the capacity for his text to evolve. As
our concepts of “truth” change, so must our perspective, our
thought, and therefore, also our style.
How do we translate this plurality of style and meaning in a
work in which they are inseparable? One reason for Kaufmann’s
retranslations was that,
For one thing, they completely misrepresent the mood of
the original—beginning, but unfortunately not ending, with
their many unjustified archaisms, their ‘thou’ and ‘ye’ with
the clumsy attendant verb forms, and their whole
misguided effort to approximate the King James Bible…
More often than not, he [Thomas Common] either
12
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overlooks a play on words or misunderstands it, an in
both cases makes nonsense of Nietzsche.13
In this criticism then we see a failure to convey this style and the
subsequent loss of meaning, the very loss that, “abets the common
misconception of the austere Nietzsche, when, in fact, no other
philosopher knew better how to laugh at himself.”14 That is one
way, then, which it seems we should not translate Nietzsche—
criticism of previous faults may help us, but how do we retain the
very style which Common seemed to betray?
Kaufmann explains his attempt at a better translation,
writing that “an effort has been made to preserve as much as
possible of his cadences, even where they are awkwardly groping
or overstrained. What is thus lost in smoothness is gained for the
understanding of the development of his style and personality.”15
Here, foreignizing is preferable to domesticating Nietzsche’s
language and Kaufmann surely shows this with his criticism of
Common’s translation and his own preference for “style and
personality” over smoothness. Kaufmann’s decision is correct if
Nietzsche’s style and meaning are inseparable—why risk
sacrificing both the beauty and innate meaning of writing for a
higher degree of ease or smoothness?
The pursuit of this brief talk, however, is not to define
methods by which translations can become flawless, nor should it
be seen as an attempt, or at least much of one, to recommend better
devices or practices for the translator. We have seen how cultural
and inter-lingual differences hinder the translation of abstract
terms—Quine’s claim that “…continuities [between languages], by
facilitating translation, encourage an illusion of subject matter…”16
in this case seems to be true. That is not to say abstract terms
cannot be translated, but instead that we must realize the existence
of conceptual differences between languages and beware of
assuming that a term from the SL holds the very same connotations
and correlations as the word that we perceive to generate it in the
TL. Furthermore, we must also be aware that translation of
13
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philosophy and of conceptual thought in general cannot be
viewed as the translation primarily of vocabulary, but also of the
translation of thought as a whole. With the connection between
style and meaning which was seen in Nietzsche, we must realize
that to translate is to interpret and that by disregarding or
privileging any particular aspect we risk damage to the work,
especially when there is such a dependence on language.
This difficulty of translation is, at least in part, a reflection
of Nietzsche’s various interpretations and ideas which, through the
metaphor, show (or, perhaps only encourage) multiplicity and
change as the only permanency. Kaufmann’s criticisms of
Common in many respects do seem to ring true, as being unable to
see Nietzsche’s humor within his seriousness, his carefulness
within his rashness—in short, this very plurality of perspectives—
would doubtlessly damage the translation of Nietzsche’s language
and his philosophy. At the same time, however, if as Sarah
Kofman wrote, “A new reading/writing destroys the traditional
categories of the book as a closed totality containing a definitive
meaning, the author’s; in such a way it deconstructs the idea of the
author as a master of the meaning of the work …”, then maybe we
may wish to seek particular meaning from the ambiguity and
multiplicity, from the very “pluralism of interpretations and their
renewal.”17 Perhaps we cannot completely discard any translation,
and instead consider different interpretations in translation and if
perhaps, as Walter Benjamin wrote, “all great texts contain their
potential translation between the lines…”18
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